Robust Adversarial Learning via Sparsifying Front Ends by Gopalakrishnan, Soorya et al.
1Robust Adversarial Learning via
Sparsifying Front Ends
Soorya Gopalakrishnan, Student Member, IEEE, Zhinus Marzi, Upamanyu Madhow, Fellow, IEEE,
and Ramtin Pedarsani, Member, IEEE
Abstract—It is by now well-known that small adversarial
perturbations can induce classification errors in deep neural
networks. In this paper, we take a bottom-up signal processing
perspective to this problem and show that a systematic exploita-
tion of sparsity in natural data is a promising tool for defense.
For linear classifiers, we show that a sparsifying front end is
provably effective against `∞-bounded attacks, reducing output
distortion due to the attack by a factor of roughly K/N where
N is the data dimension and K is the sparsity level. We then
extend this concept to deep networks, showing that a “locally
linear” model can be used to develop a theoretical foundation for
crafting attacks and defenses. We also devise attacks based on
the locally linear model that outperform the well-known FGSM
attack. We supplement our theoretical results with experiments
on the MNIST handwritten digit database, showing the efficacy
of the proposed sparsity-based defense schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Szegedy et al. [1] and Goodfellow et al. [2] pointed
out the vulnerability of deep networks to small adversarial
perturbations, there has been an explosion of research effort in
adversarial attacks and defenses [3]. In this paper, we attempt to
provide fundamental insight into both the vulnerability of deep
networks to carefully designed perturbations, and a systematic,
theoretically justified framework for designing defenses against
adversarial perturbations.
Our starting point is the original intuition in Goodfellow et al.
[2] that deep networks are vulnerable to small perturbations
not because of their complex, nonlinear structure, but because
of their being “too linear”. Consider the simple example of a
binary linear classifier w operating on N -dimensional input x,
producing the decision statistic g(x) = wTx. The effect of a
perturbation e to the input is given by g(x+e)−g(x) = wTe.
If e is bounded by `∞ norm (i.e., ‖e‖∞ = maxi |ei| ≤ ), then
the largest perturbation that can be produced at the output is
caused by e =  sgn(w), and the resulting output perturbation
is ∆ = 
∑N
i=1 |wi| = ‖w‖1. The latter can be made large
unless the `1 norm of w is constrained in some fashion. To
see what happens without such a constraint, suppose that w
has independent and identically distributed components, with
bounded expected value and variance. It is easy to see that
‖w‖1 = Θ(N)1 with high probability, which means that the
effect of `∞-bounded input perturbations can be blown up at
the output as the input dimension increases.
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1See Subsection I-B for the definitions of the order notation Θ(.), O(.),
ω(.), O(.).
The preceding linear model provides a remarkably good
approximation for today’s deep CNNs. Convolutions, subsam-
pling, and average pooling are inherently linear. A ReLU
unit is piecewise linear, switching between slopes at the bias
point. A max-pooling unit is a switch between multiple linear
transformations. Thus, the overall transfer function between the
input and an output neuron can be written as weq(x)Tx, where
weq(x) is an equivalent “locally linear” transformation that
exhibits input dependence through the switches corresponding
to the ReLU and max pooling units. For small perturbations,
relatively few switches flip, so that weq(x + e) ≈ weq(x).
Note that the preceding argument also applies to more general
classes of nonlinearities: the locally linear approximation is
even better for sigmoids, since slope changes are gradual rather
than drastic. These observations motivate us to begin with a
study of linear classifiers, before extending our results to neural
networks via a locally linear model.
As we discuss in Section II, there are a number of defenses
based on modifying the optimization procedures used for
training neural networks. In contrast, we take a bottom-up
signal processing perspective and exploit the rather general
observation that input data must be sparse in some basis in order
to avoid the curse of dimensionality. Sparsity is an intuitively
plausible concept: we understand that humans reject small
perturbations by focusing on the key features that stand out.
Our proposed approach is based on this intuition. In this paper,
we show via both theoretical results and experiments that a
sparsity-based defense is provably effective against `∞-bounded
adversarial perturbations.
Specifically, we assume that the N -dimensional input data
has a K-sparse representation (where K  N ) in a known
orthonormal basis. We then employ a sparsifying front end that
projects the perturbed data onto the K-dimensional subspace.
The intuition behind why this can help is quite clear: small
perturbations can add up to a large output distortion when
the input dimension is large, and by projecting to a smaller
subspace, we can limit the damage. Theoretical studies show
that this attenuates the impact of `∞-bounded attacks by a factor
of roughly K/N (the sparsity level), and experiments show that
sparsity levels of the order of 1-5% give an excellent tradeoff
between the accuracy of input representation and rejection of
adversarial perturbations.
A. Contributions
We develop a theoretical framework to assess and demon-
strate the effectiveness of a sparsity-based defense against
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2adversarial attacks on linear classifiers and neural networks.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• For linear classifiers, we quantify the achievable gain of the
sparsity-based defense via an ensemble-averaged analysis
based on a stochastic model for weights. We prove that
with high probability, the adversarial impact is reduced by
a factor of roughly K/N , where K is the sparsity of the
signal and N is the signal’s dimension.
• For neural networks, we use a “locally linear” model to
provide a framework for understanding the impact of small
perturbations. Specifically, we characterize a high SNR
regime in which the fraction of switches flipping for ReLU
nonlinearities for an `∞-bounded perturbation is small.
• Using the preceding framework, we show that a sparsifying
front end is effective for defense, and devise a new locally
linear attack that outperforms the well-known Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) attack [2].
• We supplement our theoretical results with experiments on
the MNIST dataset [4] for a variety of recent attacks.
B. Notation
Here we define the notations Θ(.), O(.), ω(.), and O(.):
• f = O(g) if and only if there exists a constant C > 0
such that |f/g| < C,
• f = Θ(g) if and only if there exist two constants C1, C2 >
0 such that C1 < |f/g| < C2,
• f = ω(g) if and only if there does not exist a constant
C > 0 such that |f/g| < C, and
• f = O(g) if and only if g = ω(f).
II. RELATED WORK
A. Sparse Representations
It is well-known that most natural data can be compactly
expressed as a sparse linear combination of atoms in some
basis [5–7]. Such sparse representations have led to state-of-the-
art results in many fundamental signal processing tasks such
as image denoising [8, 9], neuromagnetic imaging [10, 11],
image super-resolution [12], inpainting [13], blind audio source
separation [14], source localization [15], etc. There are two
broad classes of sparsifying dictionaries employed in literature:
predetermined bases such as wavelets [5, 16], and learnt bases
which are inferred from a set of training signals [9, 17, 18]. The
latter approach has been found to outperform predetermined
dictionaries. Sparsity has also been suggested purely as a means
of improving classification performance [19], which indicates
that the performance penalty for appropriately designed sparsity-
based defenses could be minimal.
B. Local Linearity Hypothesis
The existence of “blind spots” in deep neural networks [1]
has been the subject of extensive study in machine learning
literature [3]. It was initially surmised that this vulnerability is
due to the highly complex, nonlinear nature of neural networks.
However, the success of linearization-based attacks such as the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [2] and DeepFool [20]
indicates that it is instead due to their “excessive linearity”.
This is further backed up by work on the curvature profile
of deep neural networks [21, 22] showing that the decision
boundaries in the vicinity of natural data can be approximated
as flat along most directions. Our work on attack and defense
is grounded in a locally linear model for neural networks,
and the results discussed later demonstrate the efficacy of this
approach.
C. Defense Techniques
Existing defense mechanisms against adversarial attacks can
be broadly divided into two categories: (a) empirical defenses,
based purely on intuitively plausible strategies, together with
experimental evaluations, and (b) provable defenses with
theoretical guarantees of robustness. We briefly discuss the
empirical work related to our defense, and then give an
overview of provable defense techniques.
Empirical Defenses: Several empirical defenses utilize
preprocessing techniques that are implicitly sparsity-based,
including JPEG compression [23, 24], PCA [25] and pro-
jection onto generative models [26, 27]. However many
such techniques were found to confer robustness purely by
obfuscating gradients necessary for the adversary, and they were
successfully defeated by gradient approximation techniques
developed in [28]. In contrast our sparsity-based defense is
robust to the attack techniques in [28]. Overall, the evaluations
in such prior work have been purely empirical in nature. Our
proposed framework, grounded in a locally linear model for
neural networks, provides a foundation for systematic pursuit
of sparsity-based preprocessing.
Provable Defenses: There is a growing body of work
focused on developing provable guarantees of robustness
against adversarial perturbations [29–42]. We do not provide an
exhaustive discussion due to space constraints, but we illustrate
some typical characteristics of these approaches.
Many provable defenses focus on retraining the network with
an optimization criterion that promotes robustness towards
all possible small perturbations around the training data.
For example, Raghunathan et al. [29] develop semidefinite
programs (SDP) to upper bound the `1 norm of the gradient of
the classifier around the data point, which they then optimize
during training to obtain a more robust network. The certificates
provided are quite loose, and are outperformed by other
defenses, including ours. A tighter SDP relaxation is developed
in [30] to certify the robustness of any given network, but
it is not used to train a new robust model. Both the SDP
certificates are computationally restricted to fully-connected
networks. Another provable defense by Wong and Kolter [31]
employs a linear programming (LP) based approach to bound
the robust error. This is more efficient than the SDP approach,
and can be scaled to larger networks [32]. The LP technique
works well for small perturbations, but for larger perturbation
sizes there is a drop in the accuracy of natural images.
A different training technique based on distributionally robust
optimization was proposed by Sinha et al. [33], providing a
certificate of robustness for attacks whose probability distri-
bution is bounded in Wasserstein distance from the original
3data distribution. Although the theoretical guarantees do not
directly translate to norm-bounded attacks, this approach yields
good results in practice for small perturbation sizes. Another
defense that works well is that of Mirman et al. [34], who
use the framework of abstract interpretation to develop various
upper bounds on the adversarial loss which can be optimized
over during training. Some other provable defenses try to limit
Lipschitz constants related to the network output function, for
example via cross-Lipschitz regularization [35] and `2 matrix-
norm regularization of weights [36] in order to defend against
`2-bounded attacks. However the bounds in [35] are limited to
2-layer networks, and [36] is based on layerwise bounds that
have been shown to be loose [29, 31].
All of the above techniques try to train the network so
as to make its output less sensitive to input perturbations by
modifying the optimization framework employed for network
training. In contrast, our defense takes a bottom-up signal
processing approach, exploiting the sparsity of natural data to
combat perturbations at the front end, while using conventional
network training. It is therefore potentially complementary
to defenses based on modifying network training. Parts of
this work appeared previously in our conference paper [37]
which focused on linear classifiers. In this paper, we provide a
comprehensive treatment that applies to neural networks, by
employing the concept of local linearity. Another related work
that uses sparsity-based preprocessing is [38], which studies `0-
bounded attacks. These are not visually imperceptible (unlike
the `∞-bounded attacks that we study), but they are easy to
realize in practice, for example by placing a small sticker on
an image. For this class of attacks, [38] shows that the sparse
projection can be reformulated as a compressive sensing (CS)
problem, and obtain a provably good estimate of the original
image via CS recovery algorithms.
There is also a line of work on verifying the robustness
of a given network by using exact solvers based on discrete
optimization techniques such as satisfiability modulo theory
[39, 40] and mixed-integer programming [41, 42]. However
these techniques have combinatorial complexity (in the worst-
case, exponential in network size), and so far have not been
scaled beyond moderate network sizes.
III. SPARSITY BASED DEFENSE
A. Problem Setup
For simplicity we start with binary classification. Given a
binary inference model g : RN → R, we assume that its input
data x ∈ RN has a K-sparse representation (K  N ) in a
known orthonormal basis Ψ:
∥∥ΨTx∥∥
0
≤ K. Let us denote by
xˆ a modified version of the data sample x. We now define a
performance measure ∆ that quantifies the robustness of g(·):
∆(x, xˆ) = |g(xˆ)− g(x)|.
For example, for a linear classifier g(x) = wTx, the perfor-
mance measure is ∆(x, xˆ) = |wT (xˆ− x)|.
We now consider a system comprised of the classifier g(·)
and two external participants: the adversary and the defense,
depicted in Fig. 1.
x +
e
f(·) g(·)
Adversary Defense
x xˆ
Fig. 1: Block diagram of the system, depicting an adversarial
example x = x+e (with `∞ constraint on e), a preprocessing
defense f(·) and a classifier g(·).
1. The adversary corrupts the input x by adding a perturbation
e, with the goal of causing misclassification:
max
e
∆(x, xˆ) s.t. ‖e‖∞ < .
We are interested in perturbations that are visually im-
perceptible, hence we impose an `∞-constraint on the
adversary.
2. The defense preprocesses the perturbed data via a function
f : RN → RN, with the goal of minimizing the adversarial
impact ∆.
This setup can be easily extended to multiclass classification
as we show in Section V-E.
B. Sparsifying Front End Description
We propose a defense based on a sparsifying front end
that exploits sparsity in natural data to combat adversarial
attacks. Specifically, we preprocess the input via a front end
that computes a K-sparse projection in the basis Ψ. Figure
2 shows a block diagram of our model for a neural network,
depicting an additive perturbation followed by sparsity-based
preprocessing.
Here is an intuitive explanation of how this defense limits
adversarial perturbations. If the data is exactly K-sparse in
domain Ψ, the front end leaves the input unchanged (xˆ = x)
when there is no attack (e = 0). The front end attenuates the
perturbation by projecting it onto the space spanned by the basis
functions corresponding to the K retained coefficients. If the
perturbation is small enough, then the K retained coefficients
corresponding to x and x+ e remain the same, in which case
the neural network sees the original input plus the projected,
and hence attenuated, perturbation.
x +
e
ΨT
Retain
K largest
coefficients
Ψ
Retain only
top K
coefficients
T
2
Sparsifying front end
x xˆ
Fig. 2: Sparsifying front end defense: For a basis in which
the input is sparse, the input is projected onto the subspace
spanned by the K largest basis coefficients.
4Let HK : RN → RN represent the block that enforces
sparsity by retaining the K coefficients largest in magnitude
and zeroing out the rest. We can now define the following:
• The support SK of the K-sparse representation of x, and
the projection PK of e onto the subspace that x lies in are
defined as follows:
SK(x) , supp
(HK(ΨTx)),
PK(e,x) ,
∑
k∈SK(x)
ψkψ
T
k e.
• The high SNR regime is the operating region where the
perturbation does not change the subspace that x lies in:
High SNR: SK(x) = SK(x+ e). (1)
We characterize the conditions guaranteeing (1) in Prop. 1.
If we operate at high SNR, the front end preserves the signal
and hence its output xˆ can be written as follows:
xˆ = x+
∑
k∈SK(x)
ψkψ
T
k e = x+ PK(e,x).
Thus the effective perturbation is PK(e,x), which lives in a
lower dimensional space. Its impact is therefore significantly
reduced. In Sections IV and V, we quantify the reduction in
adversarial impact via an ensemble-averaged analysis based
on a stochastic model for the classifier g(·).
C. Characterizing the High SNR Regime
We can gain valuable design insight by characterizing the
conditions that guarantee high SNR operation of the sparsifying
front end, as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For sparsity level K and perturbation e with
‖e‖∞ ≤ , the sparsifying front end preserves the input
coefficients if the following SNR condition holds:
SNR , λ

> γ,
where λ is the magnitude of the smallest non-zero entry of
HK(ΨTx) and γ = 2 maxk ‖ψk‖1.
Proof. By Holder inequality, the SNR condition implies that
λ >  γ ≥ 2 max
k
∣∣ψTk e∣∣ ≥ ∣∣ψTi e∣∣+ ∣∣ψTj e∣∣ ∀ i, j.
In particular, we can choose i and j such that
min
i∈SK(x)
(∣∣ψTi x∣∣− ∣∣ψTi e∣∣) > max
j /∈SK(x)
∣∣ψTj e∣∣,
where we have used the fact that λ = mini∈SK(x)
∣∣ψTi x∣∣. We
can now use the triangle inequality to get
min
k∈SK(x)
∣∣ψTk (x+ e)∣∣ > max
j /∈SK(x)
∣∣ψTj e∣∣.
It is easy to see that this is equivalent to SK(x+ e) = SK(x),
which completes the proof.
A direct consequence of the SNR condition is that we
expect basis functions that are small in `1 norm to be more
effective. As we will see later in Section IV-B, this is also
a favorable criterion for performance in the white box attack
scenario. Another important design parameter is the value of
K, which must be chosen to optimize the following tradeoff:
lower sparsity levels allow us to impose high SNR even for
larger perturbations, but if the data is only approximately K-
sparse, this results in unwanted signal perturbation. We find in
our experiments that a choice of K/N of the order of 1–5%
provides an excellent balance to this tradeoff.
Our subsequent analysis assumes that the SNR condition
holds, in which case we can quantify the reduction in ad-
versarial impact solely via the effect of the front end on the
perturbation. We start with a study of linear classifiers and
then extend our results to neural networks via a locally linear
model.
IV. ANALYSIS FOR LINEAR CLASSIFIERS
Consider a linear classifier g(x) = wTx. We calculate the
adversarial impact for various attack models and quantify the
efficacy of our defense by using a stochastic model for w.
A. Impact of Adversarial Perturbation
When the front end is not present, the impact of the attack
is ∆ = wTe. By Holder inequality, we have
∆ = wTe ≤ ‖e‖∞‖w‖1 ≤  ‖w‖1 , ∆0, (2)
where the second inequality follows from the `∞ attack budget
constraint. We can observe that e0 =  sgn(w) achieves
equality in (2), which means that e0 is the optimal attack
when the adversary has knowledge of w. We use ∆0 = ‖w‖1
as a baseline to assess the efficacy of our defense.
When the defense is present, the adversarial impact ∆
becomes
∆ =
∣∣wT (xˆ− x)∣∣ = ∣∣wT PK(e,x)∣∣ = ∣∣eT PK(w,x)∣∣, (3)
where the second equality follows from the definition of
PK(e,x). We can now consider two scenarios depending on
the adversary’s knowledge of the defense and the classifier:
1. Semi-white box scenario: Here perturbations are designed
based on the knowledge of w alone, and therefore the attack
remains eSW =  sgn(w). The output distortion becomes
∆SW = 
∣∣sgn(wT )PK(w,x)∣∣. (4)
We note that the attack is aligned with w.
2. White box scenario: Here the adversary has the knowledge
of both w and the front end, and designs perturbations in
order to maximize ∆ =
∣∣eT PK(w,x)∣∣. We can use the
same Holder inequality based argument as before to prove
that the optimal perturbation is eW =  sgn(PK(w,x)).
The resulting output distortion can be written as
∆W =  ‖PK(w,x)‖1.
Thus, instead of being aligned with w, eW is aligned to
the projection of w onto the subspace that x lies in.
5B. Ensemble Averaged Performance
We now quantify the gain in robustness conferred by the
sparsifying front end by taking an ensemble average over
randomly chosen classifiers w.
Assumption. We assume a random model for w, where the
entries {wi}Ni=1 are i.i.d. with zero mean and median. Let
E[|w1|] = µ = Θ(1) and E
[
w21
]
= σ2 = Θ(1).
We observe that the baseline adversarial impact ∆0 =  ‖w‖1
scales with N . This is formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. ∆0/N converges to  µ almost surely, i.e
Pr
(
lim
N→∞
∆0
N
=  µ
)
= 1.
Thus, with no defense, the adversarial impact scales as Θ(N).
Proof. ∆0 is the sum of i.i.d. random variables  |wi| with
finite mean: E[ |wi|] =  µ < ∞. Hence we can apply the
strong law of large numbers, which completes the proof.
We now state the following theorems that characterize the
performance of the sparsifying front end defense in the semi-
white box and white box scenarios.
1. Semi-White Box Scenario:
Theorem 1. As K and N approach infinity, ∆SW/K converges
to  µ in probability, i.e.
lim
K→∞
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∆SWK −  µ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ) = 1 ∀ δ > 0.
Thus, the impact of adversarial perturbation in the case of semi-
white box attack is attenuated by a factor of K/N compared
to having no defense.
Proof. Let us assume without loss of generality that SK(x) =
{1, . . . ,K}. We can rewrite the adversarial impact (4) as
∆SW =  |ZK |, where ZK =
K∑
i=1
sgn(w)Tψkψ
T
kw.
The following lemma provides an upper bound on the mean
and variance of ZK .
Lemma 1. The mean and variance of ZK are bounded by
linear functions of K.
E[ZK ] = Kµ, var(ZK) ≤ K
(
σ2 + µ2
)
.
Proof. We can write ZK =
∑K
i=1 UiVi, where
Ui =
N∑
m=1
ψi[m]wm, Vi =
N∑
m=1
ψi[m] sgn(wm).
We observe that for i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, E[UiVi] = µ, and
var(UiVi) = σ
2 + µ2 − 2µ2
N∑
m=1
ψ4i [m],
cov(UiVi, UjVj) = −2µ2
N∑
m=1
ψ2i [m]ψ
2
j [m], i 6= j.
Hence we get E[ZK ] = Kµ, and
var(ZK) =
K∑
i=1
var(UiVi)−
K∑
i,j=1
i 6=j
cov(UiVi, UjVj)
= K
(
σ2 + µ2
)− 2µ2 N∑
m=1
K∑
i,j=1
ψ2i [m]ψ
2
j [m]
≤ K(σ2 + µ2).
We can now apply Chebyshev’s inequality to YK = ZK/K,
using the bounds in the lemma to obtain
Pr(|YK − µ| ≤ δ) ≥ 1− 1
K
(
σ2 + µ2
δ2
)
∀ δ ≥ 0. (5)
Note that |∆SW/K −  µ| =  ||YK | − µ| ≤  |YK − µ|. The
statement of the theorem follows by (5) and letting K →∞
in the above inequality.
2. White Box Scenario:
We begin with the following lemma that provides a useful
upper bound on the impact of the white box attack.
Lemma 2. An upper bound on the white box distortion ∆W
is given by
∆W ≤ 
K∑
k=1
∣∣ψTkw∣∣‖ψk‖1.
Proof.
∆W = ‖PK(w,x)‖1 = 
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
(
ψTkw
)
ψk[i]
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
∣∣ψTkw∣∣|ψk[i]| =  K∑
k=1
∣∣ψTkw∣∣‖ψk‖1.
Note that this bound is exact if the supports of the K selected
basis functions do not overlap, and consequently the white box
distortion cannot grow slower than K since the bound has K
terms. However, if the `1 norms of the basis functions do not
scale too fast with N , we can show that the distortion scales
as O(K polylog(N)), as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions ‖ψk‖1 = O(logN),
‖ψk‖∞ = O(1) ∀ k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, and ‖w‖∞ = O(1),
we have the following upper bound for ∆W:
lim
N→∞
Pr(∆W ≤ O(K polylog(N))) = 1.
Thus, the impact of adversarial perturbation in the case of white
box attack is attenuated by a factor of O(K polylog(N)/N)
compared to having no defense.
Proof. We first state the following convergence result:
Lemma 3. ψTkw → N (0, σ2) in distribution.
Proof. We show that we can apply Lindeberg’s version of
the central limit theorem, noting that ψTkw =
∑N
i=1 Yi, where
6Yi = ψk[i]wi are independent random variables with E[Yi] = 0
and var(Yi) = σ2i , with
∑N
i=1 σ
2
i = σ
2.
Now, given δ > 0, we investigate the following quantity in
order to check Lindeberg’s condition:
L(δ,N) =
1
σ2
N∑
i=1
E
[
Y 2i 1{|Yi|>δσ}
]
.
From the `∞ assumptions on ψk and w, we observe that
E
[
ψ2k[i]w
2
i 1{|Yi|>δσ}
] ≤ O2(1)O2(1) Pr{(|Yi| > δσ)}
= O2(1)O2(1) Pr
{(
|wi| > δσO(1)
)}
.
Also note that ∀ δ > 0, ∃M s.t. ∀N > M , |wi| < δσ/O(1)
∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Hence we get limN→∞ L(δ,N) = 0, which
is Lindeberg’s condition.
We can use Lemmas 2 and 3 to obtain
Pr(∆W > δ) ≤ Pr
(

K∑
k=1
∣∣ψTkw∣∣ ‖ψk‖1 > δ
)
≤ Pr
(
K⋃
k=1
{∣∣ψTkw∣∣ > δK‖ψk‖1
})
≤
K∑
k=1
Pr
(∣∣ψTkw∣∣ > δK‖ψk‖1
)
=
K∑
k=1
2Q
(
δ
 σK‖ψk‖1
)
= 2KQ
(
δ
 σ
O
(
1
K logN
))
,
where the last step follows from the `1 assumption on
ψk, and Q(x) is the Gaussian tail distribution function∫∞
x
e−t
2/2dt /
√
2pi. We complete the proof by setting δ =
O(K polylog(N)) which makes the right-hand side of the
above equation vanish as N approaches infinity.
A practical take-away from the above theoretical results is that,
in order for the defense to be effective against a white box
attack, not only do we need input sparsity (K  N ), but we
also need that the individual basis functions be localized (small
in `1 norm). The latter implies, for example, that sparsification
with respect to a wavelet basis, which has more localized basis
functions, should be more effective than with a DCT basis.
V. ANALYSIS FOR NEURAL NETWORKS
In this section, we build on the preceeding insights for
neural networks by exploiting locally linear approximations.
For simplicity we start with a 2-layer, fully connected network
trained for binary classification, and then extend our results to
a general network for multi-class classification.
A. Locally Linear Representation
Consider first binary classification using a neural network
with one hidden layer with M neurons, as depicted in Fig.
3. Since ReLU units are piecewise linear, switching between
slopes of 0 and 1, they can be represented using input-dependent
switches. Given input x, we denote by si(x) ∈ {0, 1} the
x
w2
b2
w1
b1
wM
bM
...
ReLU
... w0
Sigmoid
a1
a2
aM
y(x)
Hidden layer
Fig. 3: Two layer neural network for binary classification.
ReLU units are piecewise linear, hence the network is locally
linear: y(x) = weq(x)T x− beq(x).
switch corresponding to the ith ReLU unit. Now the activations
of the hidden layer neurons can be written as follows:
ai = ReLU
(
wTi x− bi
)
= si(x)w
T
i x− si(x) bi.
The output of the neural network can be written as
y(x) = wT0 a =
M∑
i=1
si(x)w0[i]w
T
i x−
M∑
i=1
si(x)w0[i] bi
= weq(x)
Tx− beq(x).
where
weq(x) =
M∑
i=1
si(x)w0[i]wi, beq(x) =
M∑
i=1
si(x)w0[i] bi.
This locally linear model extends to any standard neural
network, since convolutions and subsampling are inherently
linear and max-pooling units can also be modeled as switches.
For more than 2 classes, we will apply this modeling approach
to the “transfer function” from the input to the inputs to the
softmax layer, as discussed in Section V-E.
B. Impact of Adversarial Perturbation
Now we consider the effect of an `∞-bounded perturbation
e on the performance of the network. For ease of notation, we
writeweq = weq(x),weq = weq(x+e), and beq = beq(x+e).
The distortion due to the attack can be written as
∆ = y(x+ e)− y(x)
= weq
T (x+ e)− beq −weqTx+ beq
= weq
Te+
[
(weq −weq)Tx−
(
beq − beq
)]
. (6)
We observe that the distortion can be split into two terms: (i)
weq
Te that is identical to the distortion for a linear classifier,
and can be analyzed within the theoretical framework of Section
IV and (ii) (weq −weq)Tx−
(
beq − beq
)
, that is determined
by the ReLU units that flip due to the perturbation.
7In the next section, we provide an analytical characterization
of a “high SNR” regime in which the number of flipped
switches is small, motivated by iterative attacks which gradually
build up attack strength over a large number of iterations (with
a per-iteration `∞-budget of δ  ). When very few switches
flip, the distortion is dominated by the first term in (6), and
we can apply our prior results on linear classifiers to infer
the efficacy of the sparsifying front end in attenuating the
distortion. As we discuss via our numerical results, this creates
a situation in which it might sometimes be better (depending
on dataset and attack budget) for the adversary to try to make
the most of network’s nonlinearity, spending the attack budget
in one go trying to flip a larger number of switches in order
to try to maximize the impact of the second term in (6).
C. Characterizing the High SNR Regime
We now investigate the conditions that guarantee high SNR
at neuron i, i.e. si = si, where si denotes the switch when the
adversary is present.
We observe that
si =

1− si, wTi x− bi ∈
[
min
(−wTi e, 0),
max
(−wTi e, 0)]
si, w
T
i x− bi /∈
[
min
(−wTi e, 0),
max
(−wTi e, 0)],
This implies the following sufficient condition for high SNR
at neuron i:
∣∣wTi x− bi∣∣ > ∣∣wTi e∣∣.
Assumptions. To establish our theoretical result, we make a
few mild technical assumptions:
1. The data is normalized in `2-norm and bounded: ‖x‖2 = 1
and ‖x‖∞ = O(1).
2. The `∞ budget δ ≤ |bi|/‖wi‖1 − C ∀ i = 1, . . . ,M
and for some C = Θ(1) > 0. Note that this assumption is
justified in an iterative/optimization-based attack, where the
adversary gradually spends the budget over many iterations.
3. The number of neurons M = ω(1) as N gets large.
4. For each neuron i = 1, . . . ,M , we model the {wi[k], k =
1, . . . , N} as i.i.d, with zero mean E[wi[k]] = 0. We assume
that E
[
wi[k]
2
]
= σ2i = Θ(1).
Theorem 3. With high probability, the high SNR condition
(s = s) holds for 1− O(1) fraction of neurons, i.e.
lim
N→∞
Pr
( |S|
M
= 1− O(1)
)
= 1,
where S =
{
i :
∣∣wTi x− bi∣∣ > ∣∣wTi e∣∣}.
Proof. We first state the following lemma:
Lemma 4. wTi x→ N (0, σ2i ) in distribution.
Proof. We show that we can apply Lindeberg’s version of the
CLT, noting that wTi x =
∑N
j=1 Uj is the sum of independent
random variables, where Uj = xj wi[j] with E[Uj ] = 0,
var(Uj) = σ
2
i x
2
j and
∑N
j=1 σ
2
i x
2
j = σ
2
i .
Now given a constant c1 = Θ(1) > 0, we investigate the
following quantity in order to check the Lindeberg condition:
L(c1, N) =
1
σ2i
N∑
j=1
E
[
U2j 1{|Uj |>c1σi}
]
.
From the assumptions on wi and x, we observe that
E
[
x2j w
2
i [j]1{|Uj |>δσi}
] ≤ O2(1)Θ(1) Pr(|Uj | > c1σi)
= O2(1)Θ(1) Pr
(
|wi[j]| > c1σiO(1)
)
.
The `∞ assumption on wi also implies that ∀ c1 > 0, ∃N0 s.t.
|wi[j]| < c1σi/O(1), ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, N > N0. Hence we
obtain that limN→∞ L(δ,N) = 0, which verifies the Lindeberg
condition.
Noting that wTi x− bi → N (−bi, σ2i ), we can now write
Pr
(∣∣wTi x− bi∣∣ > ∣∣wTi e∣∣) ≥ Pr(∣∣wTi x− bi∣∣ > δ‖wi‖1)
= Pr
(
wTi x− bi > δ‖wi‖1
)
+ Pr
(
wTi x− bi < −δ‖wi‖1
)
= Q
(
δ‖wi‖1 + bi
σi
)
+Q
(
δ‖wi‖1 − bi
σi
)
≥ Q
(
δ‖wi‖1 − |bi|
σi
)
= Q
(‖wi‖1
σi
(
δ − |bi|‖wi‖1
))
= Q
(
Θ(N)
(
δ − |bi|‖wi‖1
))
→ 1 as N →∞,
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
e−t
2/2dt and δ < |bi|‖wi‖1 by Assump-
tion 2. The theorem follows by using a union bound over
i = 1, . . . ,M .
D. Attacks
We assume that the adversary knows the true label, a
reasonable (mildly pessimistic) assumption given the high
accuracy of modern neural networks. We consider attacks that
focus on maximizing the first term in (6), using a high SNR
approximation to the distortion:
∆ = y(xˆ)− y(x) = weqT PK(e,x) = eT PK(weq,x),
Here weq ≈ weq(x) =
∑M
i=1 si w0[i]wi if we are applying
a small perturbation to the input data. However, for iterative
attacks with multiple small perturbations, weq would evolve
across iterations.
We can now define attacks in analogy with those for linear
classifiers. The adversary can use an “effective input” x1
to compute the locally linear model weq = weq(x1). For
example, the adversary may choose x1 = x if making a small
perturbation, or may iterate computation of its perturbation
using x1 = x + e. The adversary can also use a possibly
different “effective input” x2 to estimate the set of basis
coefficients retained by the sparse front ends. Armed with
this notation, we can define two attacks:
Semi-white box: ASW(x1, ) =  sgn(weq(x1)),
White box: AW(x1,x2, ) =  sgn(PK(weq(x1),x2)).
We make no claims on the optimality of these attacks. They
are simply sensible strategies based on the locally linear model,
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Fig. 4: Multilayer (deep) neural network with L classes. Each
of the L pre-softmax outputs (logits) is locally linear: yi =
w
{i}
eq
T
x− b{i}eq , i = 1, . . . , L.
and as we show in the next section, they are more powerful
than existing FGSM attacks for multiclass classification.
For simplicity, we set x1 = x2 for the white box attack, and
simplify notation by denoting it by AW(x1, ). A (suboptimal)
default choice is to set x1 = x2 = x, relying on a high
SNR approximation for both the network switches and for
the sparsifying front end. However, we can also refine these
choices iteratively, as follows.
Iterative versions: We choose a particularly simple approach,
in which we use a small attack budget δ to change weq by small
amounts and update the “direction” of the attack, maintaining
the overall `∞ constraint at each stage:
ek+1 = ek +A(x+ ek, δ)
ek+1 = clip(ek+1),
where clip(e) , max(min(e, ),−). We believe there is
room for improvement in how we iterate, but this particular
choice suffices to illustrate the power of locally linear modeling.
Remark. The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) attack puts
its attack budget along the gradient of the cost function J(·)
used to train the network. For binary classification and the
cross-entropy cost function, we can show that it is equivalent
to the semi-white box attack with x1 = x. Specifically, we
can show that
eFGSM =  sgn(∇xJ(x, l)) = ASW(x, ),
where l is the true label, by verifying that the gradient
is proportional to weq(x). For a larger number of classes,
however, insights from our locally linear modeling can be used
to devise more powerful attacks than FGSM.
E. Multiclass Classification
In this subsection, we consider a multilayer (deep) network
with L classes. Each of the outputs of the network can be
modeled using the analysis in the previous section as follows:
yi = w
{i}
eq
T
x− b{i}eq , i = 1, . . . , L,
where y = [y1, y2, ..., yL]T , pi = Si(y), and the softmax
function Si(y) = eyi/
(∑L
j=1 e
yj
)
. Assume that x belongs to
class t (with label t known to the adversary).
Locally linear attack: The adversary can sidestep the nonlin-
earity of the softmax layer, since its goal is simply to make
yi > yt for some i 6= t. Thus, the adversary can consider
L−1 binary classification problems, and solve for perturbations
aiming to maximize yi − yt for each i 6= t. We now apply the
semi-white and white box attacks, and their iterative versions,
to each pair, with weq = w
{i}
eq − w{t}eq being the equivalent
locally linear model from the input to yi−yt. After computing
the distortions for each pair, the adversary applies its attack
budget to the worst-case pair for which the distortion is the
largest:
max
i,e
yi(x+ e)− yt(x+ e), s.t. ‖e‖∞ ≤ .
FGSM: Unfortunately, the FGSM attack does not have a clean
interpretation in the multiclass setting. Taking the gradient
of the cross-entropy betwen one-hot encoded vector of the
true label l (l[k] = δtk) and the final output of the model
p = [p1, p2, ..., pL], with J(l,p) = −
∑L
i=1 li log (pi), we
obtain
eFGSM =  sgn
(
w{t}eq (pt − 1) +
∑
k 6=t
w{k}eq pk
)
.
This does not take the most direct approach to corrupting the
desired label, unlike our locally linear attack, and is expected
to perform worse.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we demonstrate the effectiveness of
sparsifying front ends on inference tasks on the MNIST
database of handwritten digits [4]. Code is available at
https://github.com/soorya19/sparsity-based-defenses/.
A. Linear Classifiers
Setup: Here we train a linear SVM g(x) = wTx + b to
classify digit pairs d1 and d2 from the MNIST dataset. The
“direction” of the attack is opposite that of the correct class:
if the SVM predicts class d1 when g(x) < 0 and d2 when
g(x) > 0, the perturbation is of the form x = x +  sgn(w)
for images of class d1, and x = x −  sgn(w) for class d2.
We assume that the adversary has access to the true labels. For
TABLE I: Binary classification accuracies for linear SVM, with
 = 0.1 for attacks and ρ = 2% for defense.
No defense Sparsifyingfront end
Semi-white box attack 0.25 98.37
White box attack 0.25 95.37
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(b) After sparsification, the perturbed image is no longer adversarial.
Fig. 5: Sample images depicting the interplay between attack
and defense: tiny adversarial attacks can fool a classifier, but
sparsity-based preprocessing can restore accuracy by projecting
the attack down to a lower dimensional subspace.
the defense, we use the Daubechies-5 wavelet [43] to perform
sparsification and retrain the SVM with sparsified images (for
various sparsity levels) before evaluating performance.
Results: We consider the case of 3 versus 7 classification.
When no defense is present, an attack2 with  = 0.1 renders
the classifier useless, with accuracy dropping from 98.64% to
0.25% as depicted in Fig. 5(a).
Fig. 5(b) illustrates the sparsifying front end at work, showing
an image, its perturbed version and the effect of sparsification.
Insertion of the front end greatly improves resilience to
adversarial attacks: as shown in Table I, accuracy is restored
to near-baseline levels at low sparsity levels. As discussed in
Section III-C, the choice of sparsity level ρ must optimize
the tradeoff between attack attenuation and unwanted signal
distortion. We find that a value of ρ between 1–5% works well
for all digit pairs, with ρ = 2% being the optimal choice for
the 3 vs. 7 scenario.
Fig. 6 reports on accuracy as a function of sparsity level ρ
and attack budget . At the small values of ρ and  that we are
interested in, the white box attack causes more damage than
the semi-white box attack. At larger ρ and , it performs poorer
than the semi-white box attack: the high SNR condition in
Proposition 1 is no longer satisfied, hence the white box attack
is attacking the “wrong subspace”. It is easy to devise iterative
white box attacks that do better by refining the estimate of the
K-dimensional subspace in the following manner:
e[i+1] =  sgn
(
PK
(
w, x+ e[i]
))
,
2The reported values of  correspond to images normalized to [0, 1].
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Fig. 6: Binary classification accuracies for the linear SVM as
a function of the sparsity level ρ and attack budget .
with a possible initialization of e[0] = eSW. Essentially, we
refine our estimate of SK(x+e) at each iteration by calculating
the projection of w onto the top K basis vectors of x + e
(rather than just x). We can observe from the figures that the
attack with iterated projections performs better in the low SNR
region. However, this scenario is not of practical interest, since
front ends with large ρ do not provide enough attenuation of
the adversarial perturbation, and perturbations with large  are
no longer visually imperceptible.
B. Neural Networks
For neural networks, we perturb images with the following
attacks in the white box setting: (a) the locally linear attack,
(b) its iterative version, (c) FGSM [2], (d) iterative FGSM [44],
(e) projected gradient descent (PGD) [45], and (f) momentum
iterative FGSM [46] (winner of the NIPS 2017 competition
on adversarial attacks and defenses [47]). For PGD, we use
multiple random restarts and calculate accuracy over the most
successful restart(s) for each image. We evaluate three versions
of the attacks: one that uses the backward pass differential
approximation (BPDA) technique of [28] to approximate the
gradient of the front end as 1, a second version where the
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TABLE II: Multiclass classification accuracies for 4-layer CNN,
with  = 0.2 for attacks and ρ = 3.5% for defense.
No defense Sparsifyingfront end
Locally linear attack 28.43 78.27
FGSM 42.01 85.35
Iterative locally linear attack 7.36 74.38
Iterative FGSM 6.34 74.97
Momentum iterative FGSM 6.99 73.55
PGD (100 random restarts) 5.12 61.04
gradient is calculated as the projection onto the top K basis
vectors of the input, and a third version where we iteratively
refine the projection as described in the previous section. We
report accuracies for the version that causes the most damage.
Setup: For multiclass MNIST classification, we use a 4-
layer CNN consisting of two convolutional layers (containing
20 and 40 feature maps, each with 5x5 filters) and two fully
connected layers (containing 1000 neurons each, with dropout)
[48]. We use a fully connected network with 1 hidden layer
(containing 10 neurons) for binary classification of digits 3 and
7. For the sparsifying front end, we use the Coiflet-1 wavelet
for multiclass and Daubechies-5 for binary classification, and
retrain the networks with sparsified images.
Results: Table II reports on multiclass classification ac-
curacies for the 4-layer CNN where the attacks use an `∞
budget of  = 0.2. Iterative attacks are run for 1000 steps
with a per-iteration budget of δ = 0.01, except for PGD
and the iterative locally linear attack which use 100 steps
of δ = 0.05. Without any defense, a strong adversary can
significantly degrade performance, reducing accuracy from
99.31% to 5.12%. In contrast, when a sparsifying front end is
present (with sparsity level ρ = 3.5%), the network robustness
measurably improves, increasing accuracy to 61.04% in the
worst-case scenario. We note that the locally linear attack is
stronger than FGSM, and the iterative locally linear attack is
competitive with single runs of the other iterative attacks.
Figure 7 reports on binary classification accuracies for the
2-layer NN as a function of attack budget, with the front end
improving robustness across a range of . As shown in Section
V-D, FGSM is identical to the locally linear attack for binary
classification, so we do not label it in the figure. We note that
images are normalized to the range [0, 1], so by the end of
the chosen range of , perturbations are no longer visually
imperceptible.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Our results make the case that sparsity is a crucial tool for
limiting the impact of adversarial attacks on neural networks.
We have also shown that a “locally linear” model for the
network provides key design insights, both for devising and
combating adversarial perturbations. Our proposed sparsifying
front end makes an implicit assumption on the generative
model for the data that we believe must hold quite generally
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Fig. 7: Binary classification accuracies for 2-layer NN as a
function of  (with the iterative attack using 1000 steps).
for high-dimensional data, in order to evade the curse of
dimensionality. We believe that these results are the first
steps towards establishing a comprehensive design framework,
firmly grounded in theoretical fundamentals, for robust neural
networks, that is complementary to alternative defenses based
on modifying the manner in which networks are trained.
There are many directions for future research. Developing
sparse generative models for various datasets is required for
design of sparsifying front ends. For the simple datasets
considered here, the orthogonal wavelet basis considered here
was a good first guess, but it could be improved upon by
learning from data, and by use of overcomplete bases. Our
placeholder scheme of picking the largest K coefficients could
be improved by devising computationally efficient and data-
adaptive techniques for enforcing sparsity. Finally, while we
have restricted attention to simple datasets and small networks
in this paper in order to develop insight, the design of larger
(deeper) networks for more complex datasets is our ultimate
objective.
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APPENDIX
ADDITIONAL EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. SNR of sparsifying front end
Figure 8 reports on the overlap in the K-dimensional
supports of x and x+ e for attacks on linear SVM and CNN.
We can observe that the SNR condition in Section III-C is
approximately satisfied for most of the images.
Figure 11 depicts perturbed images with various support
overlaps for the SVM, showing an example in each scenario
where the defense succeeds and another where the defense fails.
For the fraction of images with low SNR, the adversary can
cause significant image distortion by shifting the support of the
K selected basis functions, but however such distortions do not
necessarily lead to misclassification. As we can observe from
the histograms, the distribution of SNRs for images where the
defense fails is almost identical to those for which it succeeds.
B. SNR of ReLU units
Figure 9 reports on the percentage of ReLU units that flip in
one iteration of the iterative locally linear attack with δ = 0.01.
When the defense is present, the high SNR condition in Section
V-B is approximately satisfied. Figure 10 shows the evolution
of the SNR condition with attack step for a 1000-step iterative
FGSM attack. We can observe that on average, the percentage
of ReLUs that flip in each iteration stays relatively small over
attack iterations.
However, as the next section shows, it could be better
for the adversary to try to make the most of the network’s
nonlinearity, for example by using iterative attacks with random
initializations (PGD), so as to cause a large number of switches
to flip to maximize the impact of the second term in Eq. (6),
Section V-B.
C. More details on attack performance
Table III reports on attack performance for the 3 versions
described in Section VI-B: one that uses the backward pass
differential approximation (BPDA) technique of [28] to ap-
proximate the gradient of the front end as 1, a second version
where the gradient is calculated as the projection onto the top
K basis vectors of the input, and a third version where we
iteratively refine the projection. For iterative attacks, we refine
the projection for 20 steps within each attack step. For PGD,
we use 100 random restarts and report accuracy over the most
successful restart(s) for each image. We report on the effect
of changing the per-iteration budget and number of steps for
iterative FGSM in Table IV.
D. Effect of sparsification on performance without attacks
Sparsification causes a slight performance hit in the accuracy
without attacks: for the 4-layer CNN, accuracy reduces from
99.31% to 98.97%. For the 2-layer NN, we report implicitly
on this effect in Figure 7 (the  = 0 points): the accuracy
goes from 99.33% to 99.28%. We note that sparsity has also
been suggested purely as a means of improving classification
performance (e.g., see Makhzani and Frey [19]) and hence
believe that with additional design effort, the performance
penalty will be minimal.
TABLE III: Multiclass classification accuracies for 4-layer CNN
on MNIST, with  = 0.2 for attacks and ρ = 3.5% for defense.
Iterative attacks were run for 1000 steps of δ = 0.01, except
for the attacks marked ∗ which use 100 steps of δ = 0.05.
Projections were iterated for 20 steps within each attack step.
BPDA
of 1 Projections
Iterated
projections
Locally linear attack 82.02 86.08 78.27
FGSM 85.35 88.18 85.84
Iter. locally linear attack 76.00 77.27 74.38∗
Iter. FGSM 74.97 79.88 75.33
Momentum iter. FGSM 74.79 73.55 —
PGD (100 restarts) 64.62∗ 65.48∗ 61.04∗
TABLE IV: Iterative FGSM accuracies ( = 0.2) as a function
of the per-iteration budget δ and number of steps used, for the
4-layer CNN with front end (ρ = 3.5%), using BPDA of 1.
δ = 0.01 δ = 0.05 δ = 0.1
20 steps 80.84 75.52 75.32
100 steps 75.13 75.17 75.02
1000 steps 74.97 75.10 75.02
E. Experiments on the Carlini-Wagner `2 attack
Since the Carlini-Wagner `2 attack does not have a fixed
bound on the distance between adversarial and true images
[49], we report on histograms of distances in Figure 12 (for
the 4-layer CNN). We set the confidence level of the attack to
0, which corresponds to the smallest possible `2 distance in
the C&W attack formulation. The final classification accuracy
is 0.92%, but 94.18% of the perturbed images lie outside the
`∞ budget of interest ( = 0.2). The attack is successful in
terms of causing misclassification, but since it is an `2 attack,
it fails to produce perturbations conforming to the `∞ budget.
We generate the attack using the CleverHans library (v2.1.0),
with default values of attack hyperparameters (listed below)
and a backward pass differential approximation (BPDA) [28]
of 1 for the gradient of the front end.
learning_rate = 5e-3, binary_search_steps = 5,
max_iterations = 1000, initial_const = 1e-2.
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(a) Support overlap for white box attack on linear SVM with  = 0.1 and K = 15.
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(b) Support overlap for PGD attack (with 100 random restarts) on CNN with  = 0.2 and K = 27.
Fig. 8: Histograms of support overlap, i.e. |SK(x) ∩ SK(x+ e)| for attacks on linear SVM and CNN. Plots are normalized to
be probability densities, i.e. the area under each histogram sums to 1.
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(a) No defense.
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(b) With sparsifying front end (ρ = 3.5%).
Fig. 9: Histograms of the percentage of ReLU units that flip in a single step of the iterative locally linear attack with δ = 0.01,
for the 4-layer CNN on MNIST. Plots are normalized to be probability densities.
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Fig. 10: Plots showing the mean percentage of ReLU units that flip in each attack step, for a 1000-step iterative FGSM attack
with δ = 0.01 and  = 0.2 on the 4-layer CNN with defense (ρ = 3.5%). Error bars represent 1 standard deviation from the
mean.
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(a) Defense success, high support overlap.
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Defense success. Support overlap |SK (x) ∩ SK (x + e)| = 9, K = 15.
(b) Defense success, low support overlap.
x e x + e
PK (x) PK (x + e)− PK (x) PK (x + e)
Defense failure. Support overlap |SK (x) ∩ SK (x + e)| = 15, K= 15.
(c) Defense failure, high support overlap.
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Defense failure. Support overlap |SK (x) ∩ SK (x + e)| = 9, K= 15.
(d) Defense failure, low support overlap.
Fig. 11: Sample images with low and high support overlap, for white box attack on the linear SVM with  = 0.1 and ρ = 2%.
The first row of each subfigure shows the original image, the perturbation and the attacked image, while the second row shows
the effect of sparsification. Here PK(x+ e) denotes the projection of x+ e onto its own K-dim. support i.e. SK(x+ e).
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Fig. 12: Histograms of adversarial examples generated by the C&W `2 attack on the 4-layer CNN.
